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Abstract
Distributed approaches for conflict resolution rely on analyzing the behavior of
each aircraft to ensure that system-wide safety properties are maintained. This
paper presents the criteria method, which increases the quality and efficiency
of a safety assurance analysis for distributed air traffic concepts. The criteria
standard is shown to provide two key safety properties: safe separation when
only one aircraft maneuvers and safe separation when both aircraft maneuver
at the same time. This approach is complemented with strong guarantees of
correct operation through formal verification. To show that an algorithm is
correct, i.e., that it always meets its specified safety property, one must only
show that the algorithm satisfies the criteria. Once this is done, then the algo-
rithm inherits the safety properties of the criteria. An important consequence
of this approach is that there is no requirement that both aircraft execute
the same conflict resolution algorithm. Therefore, the criteria approach al-
lows different avionics manufacturers or even different airlines to use different
algorithms, each optimized according to their own proprietary concerns.
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1 Introduction
Two basic approaches for conflict detection and resolution are being considered
for the NextGen Airspace: (1) a centralized concept, where a single authority
detects conflicts and makes resolution decisions for several aircraft, and (2) a
distributed concept, where the elements of the system make individual deci-
sions about maintaining conflict-free trajectories. There are advantages and
disadvantages to each approach, and any future air traffic system will likely
have both centralized and decentralized features. If the system is primarily
centralized and highly automated, then the safety of the system hinges on
assuring the correctness of the software performing the separation function
and on many other factors. Alternatively, in a distributed approach the safety
of the system cannot just rely on examining the software that is running on
the aircraft but must involve analyzing a distributed property between the air-
craft. For this reason, the safety analysis of a distributed system is probably
more complex than a similar analysis for a centralized approach. This pa-
per presents a criteria method, which simplifies the analysis of self separation
while expanding the possibility of diverse applications.
This criteria method may be used for distributed airspace systems where
aircraft execute different resolution algorithms, and it can also be used where
each aircraft execute the same algorithm. The second approach was taken
in the design of the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). A diverse
international committee met for many years and came to agreement on the
TCAS II algorithm [8]. The first approach is attractive because a large num-
ber of resolution algorithms have been proposed in recent years (see [4] for a
collection of examples) and it is difficult to imagine that everyone will agree on
mandating a single algorithm. The criteria standard allows different avionics
manufactures and perhaps different airlines to implement different algorithms,
which are optimized for different proprietary goals. All of these algorithms will
interact safely, provided that each algorithm is shown to meet the criteria. In
this concept the international community agrees on the criteria rather than on
a single algorithm. This paper presents proven results that if two algorithms
both meet the criteria presented in this paper, then their combined behavior
is safe with respect to separation, i.e., the combined effect of their maneuvers
resolves the conflict.
This paper introduces criteria that provide strong guarantees of safe sepa-
ration as long as the aircraft use state-based conflict resolution algorithms that
satisfy the common criteria, even when the algorithms are different. Safe sepa-
ration is guaranteed for all encounter geometries if only one aircraft maneuvers
or if both aircraft maneuver to avoid the conflict. When both aircraft maneu-
ver to avoid a conflict, we must ensure that the combination of the maneuvers
is safe. One way to achieve this coordinated behavior is for the aircraft to
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explicitly communicate their intentions: “I will climb, so you should descend.”
However, we focus on the concept of implicit coordination, which means that
when two aircraft maneuver, the combined effect resolves the conflict without
any additional communication between them. Only ADS-B surveillance data
that is periodically broadcast by all appropriately equipped aircraft is used
in implicit coordination. The concept presented here will guarantee implicit
coordination for arbitrary combinations of tactical guidance maneuvers (e.g.,
track only, ground speed only, vertical speed only). For example, one air-
craft may select a ground-speed solution and the other aircraft a track-only
solution, and the combined effect will still maintain separation. There are
several other advantages that accrue from the implicit coordination approach,
including: (1) less demand on the radio frequency spectrum, (2) the concept
is procedurally simpler and hence less error prone, and (3) less workload on
the pilot and controllers.
This paper presents a framework for facilitating the verification of many
different algorithms in a mathematically rigorous way, i.e., via formal methods.
The concept is built on the idea of having an intermediate verification layer,
called the criteria layer. This is illustrated in Figure 1: The top layer (yellow)
Figure 1. Criteria Concept
defines mathematical correctness for both horizontal maneuvers and vertical
maneuvers. The middle layer (light blue) contains the equations that define
the criteria, and the bottom layer contains the conflict resolution algorithms.
The middle layer is the key to achieving our goals. The correctness statements
at the top level are state-based, that is, they are specified in terms of the
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current position and velocity vectors of the two aircraft. There is no attempt
to incorporate intent information in this formulation.
The criteria layer consists of mathematical formulas that are shown to be
sufficient to guarantee correctness via formal mathematical proofs. The formu-
las are analytically defined so that many different algorithms can be checked
against the criteria in a straight-forward way. Also, the criteria only use in-
formation available to the local aircraft. Each algorithm is then separately
shown to satisfy the criteria and thereby inherits the system-wide safety prop-
erties. The criteria can also be used as a filter on any resolution algorithm
that computes multiple solutions. Only solutions that meet the criteria are
allowed to be executed and hence this revised, filtered algorithm will inherit
all of the coordination properties.
This paper proceeds first with a description of notation in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 presents individual criteria for different kinds of situations: horizontal
conflict resolution, horizontal loss of separation recovery, vertical conflict res-
olution, and vertical loss of separation recovery. Criteria are also presented
that combine the horizontal and vertical criteria in the case of 3-dimensional
conflict and loss of separation. Section 4 provides theorems stating that the
criteria guarantee independence and coordination. Most resolution maneuvers
have two complementary solutions: turn left or right, go up or down, etc.
Section 5 describes how an algorithm should choose between these comple-
mentary resolutions. In Section 6 there is a discussion about the issues that
might arise within an international committee that seeks to adopt the criteria
concept. Finally, Section 7 discusses how the criteria standard would work in
conjunction with strategic resolution methods that rely on intent information.
The contributions of this paper include: (1) a vision for guaranteeing the
safety of the next generation air-traffic management system, based on the
criteria approach, (2) the proposal of a specific set of criteria for meeting this
vision, and (3) a summary of the mathematical theory used in the criteria.
2 Notation
We consider two aircraft, the ownship and the traffic aircraft, that are poten-
tially in conflict in a 3-dimensional airspace. The conflict resolution algorithms
discussed here only use state-based information, e.g,. initial position and veloc-
ity and straight line trajectories, i.e., constant velocity vectors in a Euclidean
coordinate system.
We use the following notations:
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so 3D vector Initial position of the ownship aircraft
vo 3D vector Initial velocity of the ownship aircraft
si 3D vector Initial position of the traffic aircraft
vi 3D vector Initial velocity of the traffic aircraft
The components of each vector are scalar values, so they are represented with-
out the bold-face font, for example so = (sox, soy, soz). As a simplifying as-
sumption, we regard the position and velocity vectors as accurate and without
error. Recent work shows how measurement errors in the state information
can be correctly handled by state-based conflict detection and resolution algo-
rithms through the use of appropriate safety buffers [3]. Also, the assumption
that the resolutions are executed instantaneously can be mitigated through
the use of algorithms that filter infeasible solutions, e.g., algorithms that use
models of turn dynamics to determine whether there is sufficient time for a
turn to complete.
For notational convenience, all the dot products in this paper are two-
dimensional, ‖w‖ denotes the norm of the 2-dimensional projection of w, i.e.,
‖w‖ =√w2x + w2y, and w2 denotes w2x + w2y.
It is mathematically convenient to use a translated coordinate system. The
relative position s of the ownship with respect to the traffic aircraft is defined
to be s = so − si, and the relative velocity is denoted by v = vo − vi. Within
this translated coordinate system, the traffic aircraft is at the origin of the
coordinate system and does not move. The separation requirements in the
airspace systems are specified as a minimum horizontal separation D and a
minimum vertical separation H (typically, D is 5 nautical miles and H is
1000 feet). Horizontal and vertical perspectives of this coordinate system are
illustrated in Figure 2.
An aircraft trajectory is modeled as a particle with an initial position s,
a constant velocity vector v, and a time parameter t. As usually done in
state-based conflict detection and resolution, we ignore the effects of wind and
only use ground speed in the paper. The location of the aircraft at time t is
therefore s + tv. We will use prime notation to indicate a new velocity vector
that is computed by a conflict resolution algorithm, e.g., v′.
3 Criteria
Criteria represent the key safety requirements on the resulting velocity vectors
from an airspace separation algorithm. Formally, a criterion is a predicate on
the set of relative resolution maneuvers. These resolution maneuvers, denoted
v′, solve a safety issue related to separation. Two kinds of separation issues
are considered in this paper: (1) when the two aircraft are in conflict, i.e., a
predicted loss of separation, and (2) when the two aircraft are currently in loss
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Figure 2. Relative Horizontal and Vertical Perspectives
of separation. If an algorithm ensures that its vectors satisfy a given criterion,
then the algorithm correctly solves the separation issue, e.g., in the case of a
conflict, the impending conflict is avoided, or in the case of loss of separation,
separation is eventually recovered. The criteria are summarized in appendix B.
3.1 Horizontal Criterion for Conflict Resolution
The horizontal criterion for conflict resolution is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (horizontal criterion).
horizontal criterion(s, )(v′) ≡ s · v′ ≥ R  det(s,v′),
where R =
√
s2−D2
D
and  is a unit value ±1, which we will call a direction
parameter. Any vector v′ that satisfies this formula will resolve the conflict
if the traffic aircraft does not maneuver. If both aircraft maneuver, then
both aircraft must select resolutions using the same . This is illustrated in
Figure 3. The current ownship velocity vector is shown in blue and the current
traffic velocity vector is shown in magenta. If the conflict resolution systems
on both aircraft produce resolution vectors anywhere in their green regions,
the combined result will be implicitly coordinated. Similarly, if the conflict
resolution systems on both aircraft produce resolution vectors anywhere in
their blue regions, the combined result will be implicitly coordinated. If only
one aircraft maneuvers, then a vector in either the green or blue region will
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Figure 3. Visualization of Horizontal Criterion for Conflict
suffice. The criterion can also be applied to ground speed solutions. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.
A few observations can be made about this criterion. First, it depends on
v′, where v′ = v′o − vi, which only uses data that is available locally to an
aircraft. In particular, it does not depend upon v′i, the resolution that will
be computed on the traffic aircraft. This is fundamental to achieving implicit
coordination, because otherwise an explicit exchange of these computed values
would be necessary. Also, although figures 3 and 4 illustrate situations where
only one of the ownship’s track angle or ground speed changes, the criterion is
more general. It applies to velocity vectors v′ where both the ownship’s track
angle and ground speed change.
3.2 Horizontal Criterion for Loss of Separation
The horizontal criterion for loss of separation is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (horizontal los criterion).
horizontal los criterion(s,v, Th)(v
′) ≡
s · v′ ≥ s · v ∧
s · v′ > exit dot min(s, Th),
where
exit dot min(s, Th) ≡ ‖s‖
Th
(D − ‖s‖).
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Figure 4. Horizontal Criterion for Ground Speed
If the relative velocity v′ satisfies these two equations, then the criterion is
met. Note that the second term implies that the new dot product is positive,
which is sufficient to ensure divergence. The second term also ensures that the
recovery from the loss of separation is achieved within time Th. The correctness
theorems then ensure that if either aircraft or both aircraft execute a resolution
that meets this criterion, then the combined result will be divergence. This is
illustrated in Figure 5. The horizontal criterion for loss of separation gives only
one region for each aircraft to choose from, namely the green region. In this
example the ownship has more options because of its greater ground speed. In
Figure 6, we illustrate the impact of the second conjunction of the criterion.
The purple region shows the reduced set of vectors that are needed to escape
the protection zone within a bounded time.
Once again it should be noted that the criterion only uses data that is
available locally on an aircraft. It does not depend upon v′i the resolution
that will be computed on the traffic aircraft. Thus, an explicit exchange of
information is not necessary to achieve safe self-separation.
3.3 Vertical Criterion for Conflict Resolution
The vertical criterion is more complex than the horizontal criterion because
it is 3-dimensional. It is certainly possible to create a one-dimensional crite-
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Figure 5. Horizontal Criterion For Loss of Separation Recovery
Figure 6. Impact of Second Conjunction of the Criterion
10
rion that is suitable for vertical-speed-only solutions. However, such a one-
dimensional criteria would leave out resolution maneuvers that solve conflicts
vertically using ground-speed or track solutions. These kinds of resolutions
are possible when the aircraft are already in a climb or descent. In the relative
coordinate frame, these solutions fall within a 3-dimensional region of space.
The basic idea is to define a half plane (Figure 7) such that any vector
that intersects this plane satisfies the criterion. We will present the formulas
p
v’
Figure 7. Vertical Criterion
that define this 3-dimensional criteron subsequently, but it is helpful to first
examine the criterion for the special cases where only the vertical speed is
changed. This special case is one-dimensional.
3.3.1 Vertical Criterion For Vertical Speed Only
There are three basic cases that must be considered:
• Both horizontal and vertical separation exist originally (see Figure 8).
• Only horizontal separation exists originally (see Figure 9).
• Only vertical separation exists originally (see Figure 10).
These regions are determined by the initial position s and one of the corners
of the protection zone. The horizontal position of a corner is specified using
the horizontal entrance/exit times:
• Θ−1 = horizontal entrance time.
• Θ+1 = horizontal exit time.
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Figure 9. Vertical Criterion Vertical Speed Only Case 2
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Figure 10. Vertical Criterion Vertical Speed Only Case 3
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and the vertical position of a corner is specified with a flag  which indicates
top and bottom:
•  = -1 indicates the bottom of protection zone.
•  = +1 indicates the top of protection zone.
Note also that the direction dir, whether an entry (dir = −1) into the protec-
tion zone, or an exit (dir = +1) from the protection zone, can be calculated
as follows:
dir = IF |sz| ≥ H THEN  · sign(sz) ELSE − 1 ENDIF.
Note that the following two formulas
|sz| ≥ H AND dir =  · sign(sz)
and
|sz| < H AND dir = −1
define the allowed corner points. That is, the border of the criterion region is
defined by a line going through these points. The function sign returns −1 if
its argument is negative and +1 otherwise.
3.3.2 The General Vertical Criterion Formula
We will illustrate the concept with the case where there is horizontal separation
and sz > H, which is shown in Figure 11. The point p can be calculated as
p
s
p
Figure 11. Vertical Criterion Vertical Speed Only Case 3
follows:
p = (s + Θ+1v) WITH [z ← H],
which is (s+Θ+1v) with the z component replaced with H. We now construct
a line perpendicular to p (and hence tangent to the circle) as illustrated in
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Figure 12. Construction of Tangent Plane
Figure 12. Next, we construct the half-plane that passes through this line and
is directly above pz as illustrated in Figure 7. The vertical criterion states that
if a velocity vector v′ from s intersects this plane, then it is accepted. The
plane is completely determined by the point p and logic specifying which half
of the plane is to be used. The point p defines the vector that is the minimal
vertical speed only solution from s. More formally, we can define the vertical
criterion as follows.
Definition 3.3 (vertical criterion).
vertical criterion?(s,v, )(v′) =
(‖v‖ = 0 AND v′z ≥ 0 AND  sz ≥ H
OR
dir = IF |sz| ≥ H THEN  · sign(sz) ELSE − 1 ENDIF AND
∆(s,v) > 0 AND Θdir > 0 AND
p = (s + Θdirv) WITH [z :=  H] AND
intersects half plane?(s,v′,p, )).
The first term deals with the special case where the relative ground speed
between the aircraft is zero, i.e., they are flying parallel to each other. The
auxiliary function intersects_half_plane? is defined as follows:
intersects half plane?(s,v,p, ) =
v · p 6= 0 AND
t =
D2 − s · p
v · p AND
t ≥ 0 AND
 (sz + tvz) ≥  pz,
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where the dot products are two-dimensional and ∆(s,v) = D2v2 − (s⊥ · v)2.
This vertical criterion not only includes the vertical-speed only solutions
shown in figures 8, 9, and 10, but also vertical resolutions that are achieved by
modifying horizontal parameters of the aircraft, i.e., ground speed and track
angle. This criterion is illustrated in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Vertical Criterion: Perspective View
3.4 Vertical Criterion for Loss of Separation Recovery
The vertical loss of separation criterion is only concerned with the vertical
component (sz or vz) of the position and velocity vectors. A more general 3-
dimensional version can be envisioned that would allow horizontal maneuvers
that achieve vertical separation when the ownship is currently climbing or
descending. Whether such a generalization is desirable operationally is not
obvious. This criterion has two components: one to ensure that the aircraft
diverge and one to provide a maximum time to recover vertically from the
loss of separation. The predicate vertical_los_criterion? captures this
criterion.
Definition 3.4 (vertical los criterion).
vertical los criterion?(s,v, Tv)(v
′) =
|sz| < H AND
z criterion?(s, vz)(v
′
z) AND
Tv ≥ ttez(sz, v′z).
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The function ttez computes the time to exit vertically as follows:
ttez(sz, vz) =
 sign(vz)H − sz
vz
,
for non-zero vz.
The predicate z_criterion? provides one way to guarantees that the two
aircraft will diverge.
z criterion?(s, vz)(v
′
z) =
v′z 6= 0 AND
z prop?(sz, v
′
z) AND
(z prop?(sz, vz) =⇒
IF vz 6= 0 THEN
sign(vz) v
′
z ≥ 0
ELSE
break symmetry(s) (v′z) > 0,
ENDIF).
where z_prop? is defined as
z_prop?(sz, vz) = szvz ≥ 0,
and sign returns −1 if its argument is negative and +1 otherwise.
The divergence criterion is conceptually simple even though the formal
specification is somewhat lengthy. The key idea is contained in z_prop?,
which sends an aircraft upward if it is higher and downward if it is lower than
the other aircraft. The break_symmetry function returns a unit value, i.e.,
±1, and is used in the situation where the original vertical speeds are equal
(i.e., vz = 0) to overcome the symmetry. It can be any function which satisfies
the following two properties:
s 6= 0 =⇒ break symmetry(−s) = −break symmetry(s),
sz 6= 0 =⇒ break symmetry(s) = sign(sz).
3.5 3-Dimensional Criteria
The 3-dimensional criteria that combine the horizontal and vertical criteria for
conflict and loss of separation are defined as follows.
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Definition 3.5 (criterion 3D).
criterion 3D(s,v, h, v)(v
′) ≡ (s2 ≥ D2 AND
horizontal criterion(s, h)(v
′)) OR
(vertical criterion(s,v, v)(v
′) AND
(s2 < D2 OR
horizontal criterion(s, h)(v
′ − v))).
Definition 3.6 (los criterion 3D).
los criterion 3D(s,v, T )(v′) ≡ horizontal los criterion(s,v, T )(v′) OR
vertical los criterion(s,v, T )(v′).
4 Correctness Theorems
The correctness theorems for the conflict case ensure that the resolutions result
in conflict free trajectories. The correctness theorems for the loss of separation
case establish two key properties:
• Divergence of the two aircraft.
• Timeliness of the recovery, that is separation will be achieved within a
specified amount of time.
The theorems in this section are presented without proof. For a presenta-
tion of the proofs, see [6].
4.1 Horizontal Correctness Theorems
4.1.1 Conflict Case
The horizontal distance between two aircraft at time t has a simple represen-
tation in the relative frame:√
[(sox + voxt)− (six + vixt)]2 + [(soy + voyt)− (siy + viyt)]2
=
√
(sx + vxt)2 + (sy + vyt)2
= ‖s + v t‖.
where s and v are 2-dimensional relative vectors in the horizontal plane. A
conflict is a predicted loss of separation. Thus, horizontal_conflict can be
defined as a loss of separation in the horizontal plane:
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Definition 4.1 (horizontal conflict).
horizontal_conflict?(s,v) ≡ ∃t : ‖s + v t‖ < D.
This predicate is true whenever the two aircraft are in conflict. In other
words there exists a future time t where a loss of separation will occur.
We can now present the key correctness theorems, when one aircraft ma-
neuvers (independence) and when both aircraft maneuver (coordination).
Theorem 4.1 (horizontal criterion independence). If the aircraft are
horizontally separated at s, then
horizontal criterion(s, )(v) =⇒
NOT horizontal conflict?(s,v).
The theorem above establishes that the horizontal criterion (Definition 3.1)
is sufficient when only one of the aircraft maneuvers. The next theorem states
that the horizontal criterion is also adequate when both aircraft maneuver.
This is implicit in the fact that the argument to horizontal_conflict? is
v′o − v′i, which contains both of the new velocity vectors for the ownship and
intruder aircraft.
Theorem 4.2 (horizontal criterion coordination). If the aircraft are
horizontally separated at s, then
horizontal conflict?(s,vo − vi) AND
horizontal criterion?(s, )(v′o − vi) AND
horizontal criterion?(−s, )(v′i − vo)
=⇒
NOT horizontal conflict?(s,v′o − v′i).
The theorem also reveals that it is essential that the unit value  = ±1
must be the same for both aircraft in order for there to be coordination. Note
that the criterion for the traffic aircraft has arguments that are the negative
of the ownship. The position of the traffic aircraft relative to the ownship is
si − so, which equals −s and vi − vo, which equals −v.
4.1.2 Loss of Separation Case
For the loss of separation recovery theorems we need to introduce two ad-
ditional predicates, horizontal_sep_after? and horizontal_divergent?,
which are defined as follows:
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Definition 4.2 (horizontal sep after?).
horizontal sep after?(s,v, t) ≡
∀t′ : t′ ≥ t =⇒ (s + tv)2 ≥ D2.
This predicate is true if and only if the aircraft are adequately separated for
all times greater than t.
Definition 4.3 (horizontal divergent?).
horizontal divergent?(s,v) ≡ ∀t : t > 0 =⇒ ‖s‖ < ‖s + tv‖.
This predicate is true if the distance between the aircraft is strictly increasing
for all times greater than t.
The key horizontal loss of separation theorems are:
Theorem 4.3 (horizontal los criterion independence).
horizontal los criterion?(s,v, Th)(v
′)
=⇒
horizontal divergent?(s,v′) AND
horizontal sep after?(s,v′, Th).
Thus, if only one aircraft maneuvers and its algorithm satisfies the criterion,
then the two aircraft will be in a divergent state, and within time Th, they will
no longer be in loss of separation. The next theorem covers the case where
both aircraft maneuver.
Theorem 4.4 (horizontal los criterion coordination).
horizontal los criterion?(s,vo − vi, T1)(v′o − vi) AND
horizontal los criterion?(−s,vi − vo, T2)(v′i − vo)
=⇒
horizontal divergent?(s,v′o − v′i) AND
horizontal sep after?(s,v′o − v′i, min(T1, T2)).
The theorem shows us that if both aircraft’s algorithms satisfy the criterion,
then the combined result will be implicitly coordinated. This is reflected in
the fact that both horizontal_divergent? and horizontal_sep_after? (in
the conclusion) have v′o − v′i as their parameters (i.e., both of the aircraft’s
resolutions). Note that the time to exit from the protection zone is the mini-
mum of the two local times T1 and T2. Thus, each local aircraft will meet its
local timeliness goal.
For examples of formally verified practical algorithms for recovery from
loss of separation, the reader is referred to [2].
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4.2 Vertical Correctness Theorems
4.2.1 Conflict Case
The vertical correctness theorems in the conflict case are 3-dimensional. They
include the case when the velocity vector v′ achieves vertical separation by
only modifying the vertical speed, but also the cases when vertical separation
is achieved by modifying the horizontal components of v′.
We introduce a predicate conflict?, which is true whenever there is a
future time where both vertical and horizontal separation is lost:
Definition 4.4 (conflict?).
conflict?(s,v) = ∃t : t ≥ 0 AND |sz + tvz| < H AND (s + tv)2 < D2.
The key correctness theorems are:
Theorem 4.5 (vertical criterion independence).
vertical criterion?(s,v, )(v′) =⇒
NOT conflict?(s,v′).
Theorem 4.6 (vertical criterion coordination).
conflict?(s,vo − vi) AND
vertical criterion?(s,vo − vi, )(v′o − vi) AND
vertical criterion?(−s,vi − vo,−)(v′i − vo)
=⇒
NOT conflict?(s,v′o − v′i).
The first theorem establishes correctness when only one aircraft maneuvers,
and the second theorem establishes correctness when both aircraft maneuver.
It is important to note that as long as the ownship uses the unit value  = ±1
and the intruder uses the opposite value −, coordination is guaranteed. We
also note that this is different from the horizontal theorems where it is required
the unit value  to be the same for the ownship and intruder aircraft.
4.2.2 Loss of Separation Case
As noted in Section 3.4, the vertical loss of separation criterion is one-dimensional.
Therefore, we introduce predicates that define divergence and timeliness with
respect to the vertical dimension alone. Vertical divergence is defined by
vertical_divergent:
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Definition 4.5 (vertical divergent).
vertical divergent?(s,v) ≡
∀t : t > 0 =⇒ |sz| < |sz + t vz|.
Definition 4.6 (vertical sep after).
vertical sep after(s,v, t) ≡
|sz + t vz| > H.
These predicates appear in the correctness theorem to ensure that there is
divergence in the vertical dimension and that recovery will be achieved within
a maximum time, say Tv. The vertical loss of separation theorems provide
results for both the independent and the coordinated cases:
Theorem 4.7 (vertical los criterion independence).
vertical los criterion?(s,v, Tv)(v
′)
=⇒
vertical divergent?(s,v′) AND
vertical sep after?(s,v′, Tv).
Theorem 4.8 (vertical los criterion coordination).
‖s‖ 6= 0 AND
vertical los criterion?(s,vo − vi, Tv)(v′o − vi) AND
vertical los criterion?(−s,vi − vo, Tv)(v′i − vo)
=⇒
vertical divergent?(s,v′o − v′i) AND
vertical sep after?(s,v′o − v′i, Tv).
The first predicate rules out the situation where the two aircraft are exactly
over each other (i.e., their horizontal distance apart is 0).
4.3 3-D Correctness Theorems
The correctness theorems for the 3-dimensional conflict and loss of separation
criteria are stated as follows.
Theorem 4.9 (criterion 3D independence).
criterion 3D?(s,v, h, v)(v
′) =⇒
NOT conflict?(s,v′).
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Theorem 4.10 (criterion 3D coordination).
conflict?(s,vo − vi) AND
criterion 3D?(s,vo − vi, h, v)(v′o − vi) AND
criterion 3D?(−s,vi − vo, h,−v)(v′i − vo)
=⇒
NOT conflict?(s,v′o − v′i).
Theorem 4.11 (los criterion 3D independence).
los criterion 3D?(s,v, T )(v′)
=⇒
divergent?(s,v′) AND
separation after?(s,v′, T ),
where
divergent?(s,v′) ≡ horizontal divergent?(s,v′) OR
vertical divergent?(s,v′),
separation after?(s,v′, t) ≡ horizontal sep after?(s,v′, t) OR
vertical sep after?(s,v′, t).
Theorem 4.12 (los criterion 3D coordination).
los criterion 3D?(s,vo − vi, T1)(v′o − vi) AND
los criterion?(−s,vi − vo, T2)(v′i − vo)
=⇒
divergent?(s,v′o − v′i) AND
separation after?(s,v′o − v′i, min(T1, T2)).
These theorems guarantee that all combinations of horizontal and vertical
manuevers are independently correct and that they are implicitly coordinated.
5 Choice of Direction Parameter, 
The criteria presented in Section 3 include a direction parameter , which is
a unit value ±1. This parameter captures the notion of whether the aircraft
should turn to the left or right in the horizontal dimension, or similarly up or
down in the vertical dimension. From the standpoint of the criteria, the choice
is arbitrary, and either choice is safe. Since either choice is safe, we can choose
an epsilon based on other factors, such as minimizing the size of the turn.
The key idea is that the choice of  is just as significant a policy decision
as the agreement on the criteria itself.
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5.1 Horizontal Direction Parameter
There are many schemes that could be developed for choosing the horizon-
tal unit value  used by both aircraft involved in a pairwise conflict, but it
is essential that if Horizontal_Direction is the function that chooses the
horizontal , the following property holds:
Horizontal Direction(s,v) = Horizontal Direction(−s,−v). (1)
This is sufficient to ensure that both aircraft will choose the same  for the
horizontal case.
One simple schema that satisfies Formula (1) is to mandate that  = 1, i.e.,
use the green solutions only. Alternatively, we could set  = −1 and only use
blue solutions. The use of a simple static method for choosing the horizontal
direction parameter, e.g.,  = −1, will inevitably leave out useful coordinated
solutions. This is illustrated in Figure 14. For this configuration of aircraft,
Figure 14. Static  = -1 Direction Problem
there are no blue ( = −1) ownship resolutions. Note that the traffic aircraft
has both green and blue resolutions. The brown region is where the green and
blue regions overlap. There are other configurations where there are no green
solutions.
We recommend the following method:
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Definition 5.1 (Preferred Horizontal Direction Parameter).
 = sign(s⊥ · v ≥ 0).
This non-static method will sometimes pick a green region and sometimes pick
a blue region, as illustrated in Figure 15. The top configuration in Figure 15
Figure 15. Our Recommended Direction Parameter
results in a green choice while the bottom configuration results in a blue choice.
Nevertheless, in all cases the combined result will be implicitly coordinated.
5.2 Vertical Direction
Any function Vertical_Direction that chooses a unit value  for the vertical
criterion must satisfy
Vertical Direction(s,v) = −Vertical Direction(−s,−v). (2)
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This property guarantees that if the ownship chooses a unit value  = ±1, the
intruder aircraft will choose the opposite value −.
A simple schema that satisfies Formula (2) is to use  = 1 for the aircraft
that is higher,  = −1 for the lower aircraft, and to use a breaking symmetry
mechanism if the aircraft are at the same flight level. There are many possi-
bilities for the symmetry breaking function and any can be used as long as the
following property holds:
s 6= 0 =⇒ break symmetry(s) = −break symmetry(−s).
For example, the following function satisfies the property above:
break symmetry(s) ≡ IF sz > 0 OR
(sz = 0 AND sx > 0) OR
(sz = 0 AND sx = 0 AND sy > 0)
THEN 1
ELSE − 1
ENDIF.
The simple schema is not ideal when the aircraft is currently climbing or
descending. Consider the following diagram (Figure 16), where the aircraft
is currently descending and is only slightly higher than the other aircraft. In
+H
−H
Figure 16. Vertical Criterion: Perspective View
this case it is better to increase the speed of the descent rather than abruptly
change directions and climb upward. Thus, we prefer the following method to
select the vertical unit value :
Definition 5.2 (Preferred Vertical Direction Parameter).
 = IF sz + Θ−1 vz > 0 THEN 1
ELSEIF sz + Θ−1 vz < 0 THEN − 1
ELSE break symmetry(s)
ENDIF.
This policy checks the z-component at the time of horizontal entry into the
protection zone.
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6 International Standard for State-Based Co-
ordination
Under the assumption that distributed self-separation is deemed to have suf-
ficient benefit to the airspace community, an international standard would
have to be created and adopted that defines the specifics of the criteria and
their application. An important part of the work of this committee will be
to develop the requirements that the separation algorithms must meet. These
requirements must be evaluated for their safety properties in the manner of a
detailed analysis, similar to what was presented in Section 4. The advantage
of the criteria standard, which is advocated in this paper, is that it allows
efficient investigation of these requirements on algorithms. The efficiency is
a result of part of the safety analysis that is done once for all algorithms. If
a single algorithm is mandated by the standard then, undoubtedly, multiple
algorithm candidates will be evaluated first, so the efficiency of the criteria
standard is an important enabling technology. On the other hand, if multiple
algorithms are allowed, then the safety requirements are precisely the criteria,
along with the associated choice of  (see Section 5).
Understanding the criteria and proofs of correctness requires a certain level
of mathematical sophistication. We have attempted to aid the mathematical
analysis through the development of a mathematical framework for analyzing
criteria and algorithms. We call this framework the Airborne Coordinated
Conflict Resolution and Detection (ACCoRD) framework [9]. This framework
has been developed with generality in mind. We want to support a wide
class of algorithms and criteria. Achieving implicit coordination for both the
independent and coordinated cases is non-trivial, and our criteria are by no
means unique. Other criteria could be created, but eventually the world com-
munity must decide on a set of criteria that will be adopted. Conceivably,
the ACCoRD framework may be used for other criteria as well. We believe
that our criteria are very general and powerful, but future refinements and
improvements are possible. We have at least shown mathematically that such
an approach is viable.
All types of analysis rely on certain assumptions, and ACCoRD is no ex-
ception. Several idealistic assumptions were made in these proofs: (1) input
data contains no errors, (2) the computations were performed with infinite
precision, i.e., mathematical real numbers, (3) the resolution maneuvers can
be performed instantaneously, and (4) at least one aircraft must implement the
prescribed maneuver in a timely manner and the other aircraft must either not
change its velocity vector or do so in accordance with the critieria, and (6) only
two aircraft are involved in a conflict at the same time. An on-going research
effort is underway to enhance ACCoRD by relaxing all of these assumptions.
One great advantage of the formal mathematical approach is that the proofs
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of correctness can not only be checked by domain experts, but they can also
be checked by specialized software called theorem provers. The mathematical
proofs in ACCoRD were verified using the PVS theorem prover [7].
7 Implications for Strategic Algorithms
The safety argument for a distributed implementation of self separation is typ-
ically built around the idea that there are layers of recovery. Typical layers
include (1) strategic conflict resolution, (2) state-based tactical conflict resolu-
tion, and finally (3) collision avoidance [1,10]. The strategic conflict resolution
system is designed to provide highly efficient solutions but, due to its complex-
ity, it may fail to produce a timely solution. In this case, the system is designed
with a backup conflict detection and resolution algorithm that is state-based.
If this backup fails to resolve the conflict, then there is a collision avoidance
mechanism such as TCAS II to prevent catastrophe. Each system layer con-
tributes to the safety of the system. The strategic layer solves many conflicts
and thus the tactical system is invoked infrequently. The tactical layer solves
the majority of the remaining conflicts and thus the collision avoidance system
is very infrequently invoked. The safety of the system fundamentally depends
upon certain correctness properties of these layers, but especially upon the
state-based backups. This is precisely where the criteria provide the needed
guarantees. The tactical conflict resolution algorithms need only satisfy the
conflict criteria to inherit the needed properties. The collision avoidance algo-
rithms need only satisfy the loss of separation criteria.
Strategic algorithms incorporate both the current position and velocity
of the aircraft, but also include expected turns, accelerations, decelerations,
climbs, and descents. In strategic conflict detection resolution algorithms,
coordination is sometimes achieved using different pilot alerting times for the
two aircraft. Using this approach, only one aircraft maneuvers at a time. The
aircraft with the larger lookahead time is often referred to as the burdened
aircraft. It is essential that the mechanism for choosing the burdened aircraft
be unambiguous and well-defined for all possible configurations of aircraft.
We can envision an approach that blends this idea with the criteria approach
presented in this paper. While the time to loss of separation is large, only
the burdened aircraft maneuvers. However, if the time to loss of separation is
small, both aircraft are allowed to maneuver in accordance with the criteria.
We would also recommend that the strategic algorithms choose a maneuver
(for the burdened aircraft) that is consistent with the criteria. In this way a
seamless transition to the state-based algorithms would be achieved. In this
blended concept, the criteria serve as a filter on the allowed solutions from the
strategic algorithms. In fact, any resolution algorithm can be made consistent
with the criteria by using the criteria to filter resolutions.
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There is another advantage to using the criteria to filter strategic resolution
algorithm solutions: it provides fault tolerance. Suppose that there is some
failure in the selection of the burdened aircraft due to data errors or some
system failure. If both aircraft erroneously conclude that they are the burdened
aircraft, the use of criteria will ensure that the combined result is coordinated.
8 Conclusions
The goal of this work was to develop a mechanism that would allow for the
efficient safety analysis of many different separation algorithms. As a con-
sequence of this research, we discovered a way to ensure that aircraft using
different conflict resolution algorithms will still have a strong guarantee of
aircraft separation. We have shown that a correct algorithm will perform a
safe maneuver when both aircraft maneuver at the same time or when only
one aircraft executes a maneuver. The mechanism proposed in this paper is
the use of an intermediate layer called the criteria layer. For each criterion,
the basic idea is to decompose the safety argument into two steps: first, the
criterion implies correctness, and second an algorithm satisfies the criterion.
The first step establishes that the criterion is sufficient to meet the correctness
properties. This verification step has already been accomplished within the
ACCoRD framework [9]. We note that if alternate formulas are adopted, the
verification would need to be redone. However, some mathematical tools have
been developed that could simplify this new verification [6]. The second step
shows that a particular algorithm meets the criterion. This must be accom-
plished for each new algorithm that is developed. We believe that this step is
relatively easier than the first step.
For multiple algorithms to be used safely within the distributed concept for
self-separation, the international standard must agree on both specific formu-
las for criteria and a particular method for choosing the direction parameters
() that appear in the criteria. Some may argue that the proposed criteria
are too complex for an international standard to address. We counter that
argument with the observation that the criteria here are far simpler than the
specification of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), whose state ma-
chine representation is over 700 pages long [8]. Furthermore, the estimated
cost of the TCAS II development over a period of fifteen years was $400 mil-
lion in 2001 dollars. This estimate includes tests, analyses, and computer
simulations [5]. The criteria formulas presented in this paper are complex and
a certain level of mathematical sophistication is required to understand them.
However, separation systems are complex and safety critical by their nature.
We conclude that it will be easier to mandate a set of criteria than attempt
to gain international agreement for the development of a single algorithm.
We have sought to make the criteria as general as possible, though we
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expect that improvements will continue to be made. An air transportation
system built around a criteria standard will be far more general and flexible
than a concept where a particular algorithm is mandated. Specifically, the
criteria standard supports the natural evolution of the air transportation sys-
tem as better technologies are introduced that enable better algorithms. In
an approach where a single algorithm is mandated, changes in technologies
require new international committees. However, in the criteria approach, it is
only necessary to show that the new algorithm satisfies the criteria. It then
inherits the system-wide global guarantees of coordinated resolutions.
Additionally, the criteria may be used in other contexts. For instance, the
criteria can be displayed on the ground control station so that the controllers
have an indication of what the algorithms will do. In fact, this criterion
approach is not limited to only distributed separation assurance protocols.
It could be applied to ground-based concepts. In this way, as long as the
controllers choose resolutions within the criteria, hand-offs between sectors, or
even between nations, would be coordinated.
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Appendix A
Summary of Notation
break_symmetry function used to break vertical symmetry
conflict?(s,v) true if aircraft are in conflict horizontally and ver-
tically
criterion_3D the 3-dimensional criterion for conflict resolution
D diameter of protection zone around an aircraft
∆(s,v) discriminant of quadratic equation from ‖s+tv‖2 =
D2
det(s,v) sxvy − syvx
horizontal_divergent?(s,v) true if horizontal distance between two aircraft is
increasing
 ±1, the direction parameter
exit_dot_min(s, t) |s|
t
(D − |s|)
H height of protection zone around an aircraft
horizontal_criterion the criterion for horizontal conflict resolution
horizontal_los_criterion the criterion for horizontal loss of separation recov-
ery
horizontal_conflict?(s,v) true if aircraft are in conflict horizontally
horizontal_sep_after?(s,v, t) true if aircraft will be horizontally separated after
time t
los_criterion-3D the 3-dimensional criterion for loss of separation re-
covery
Θ−1 horizontal entrance time into protection zone
Θ+1 horizontal exit time from protection zone
sign(x) IF x ≥ 0 THEN 1 ELSE − 1 ENDIF
so initial position of the ownship aircraft
si initial position of the traffic aircraft
vertical_criterion? the criterion for vertical conflict resolution
vertical_los_criterion? the criterion for vertical loss of separation recovery
vertical_sep_after(s,v′o,v
′
i, t) true iff there is vertical separation after t
vertical_divergent?(s,v) true if vertical distance between two aircraft is in-
creasing
‖w‖ two-dimensional norm of vector w
z_prop?(s,v) szvz ≥ 0
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Appendix B
Summary of Criteria
The following table provides a quick reference summary of the criteria
presented in this paper.
Conflict Resolution Loss of Separation Recovery
horiz. s · v′ ≥ R det(s,v′) s · v
′ ≥ s · v ∧
s · v′ > exit_dot_min(s,T)
vert.
∆(s,v) > 0 ∧ Θdir > 0 ∧
p = (s + Θdirv) WITH [z ←  H] ∧
intersects_half_plane?(s,v′,p, )
|sz| < H ∧
z_criterion?(s, vz)(v′z) ∧
Tv ≥ ttez(sz, v′z)
3D
(s2 ≥ D2 ∧
horizontal_criterion(s, h)(v′)) ∨
(vertical_criterion(s,v, v)(v′) ∧
(s2 < D2 ∨
horizontal_criterion(s, h)(v′ +
v)))
horizontal_los_criterion(s,v, T )(v′) ∨
vertical_los_criterion(s,v, T )(v′)
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